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"SEXUAL MOTIVATION" AFTER STATE V. HALSTIEN:
STILL HAZY FOR HIS TEENAGE PEERS
Robert E. Lipscomb
Abstract: In State v. Halstien, the Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a juvenile statute that provides for a charge of sexual motivation in offenses other than sex
offenses. Such motivation, if proven, becomes an aggravating factor that a judge may
consider (along with any mitigating factors) in sentencing. In rejecting the argument that the
statute was void for vagueness, the court should have clarified the statute by requiring a
finding that the defendant manifested a sexual disorder, as well as a finding that sexual
motivation was a substantial factor in the offense.
In 1990, the Washington Legislature passed a statute that allows
prosecutors to make special allegations of sexual motivation in juvenile
cases other than sex offenses.' A finding of sexual motivation under the
statute is used as an aggravating factor in sentencing? State v. Halstien3
involved a challenge to the statute's constitutionality. The Washington
Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the juvenile statute was not
unconstitutionally vague, either on its face or as applied to the defendant,
Halstien.4
This Note maintains that the supreme court should have adopted
meaningful narrowing constructions for the statute. Without
clarification, the statute fails to provide either fair notice to potential
offenders or sufficient safeguards against arbitrary enforcement. This
I. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.135 (1992). The Legislature also passed a similar statute that applies
to adult offenders, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.127 (1992).
2. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(i)(v) (1992). Although this subdivision refers to findings of
sexual motivation pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.127, which applies to adult offenders, it
should properly refer to § 13.40.135, since it is describing an aggravating factor in juvenile offenses.
The sentencing court balances aggravating factors against any mitigating factors, as defined in Wash.
Rev. Code § 13.40.150(3)(h) (1992).
3. 122 Wash. 2d 109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993).
4. Id. at 121,857 P.2d at 278. The adult sexual motivation statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.127
(1992), was also recently the subject of a vagueness challenge in State v. Stewart, 72 Wash. App.
885, 866 P.2d 677 (1994). The defendant had been convicted of attempted kidnapping, second-
degree assault, and firearms violations, and had received an enhanced sentence pursuant to §
9.94A.127 after the trial court found he had committed his crimes with a sexual motivation. Id. at
888-90, 866 P.2d at 679-80. The court of appeals held that because this statute had not been
enacted at the time of Stewart's conviction, the imposition of the enhanced sentence violated the ex
post facto clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. Id. at 893-94, 866 P.2d at 682-83.
Because of this holding, the court did not have to address the vagueness challenge. It observed,
however, that this argument would have failed in light of the supreme court's holding in State v.
Halstlen. Id. at 894 n.6, 866 P.2d at 683 n.6.
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Note begins with an overview of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as well
as some fundamental principles of statutory construction. A review of
the facts of Halstien follows. The Note then takes issue with the
supreme court's holding that the sexual motivation statute is sufficiently
clear as it stands. Finally, this Note suggests two narrowing
constructions that the court should have adopted in order to clarify the
statute: (1) a requirement that the defendant show signs of a sexual
disorder while committing the offense; and (2) a requirement that sexual
motivation be a substantial factor in the commission of the offense.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATES OF VOID FOR VAGUENESS
The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that statutes provide fair
warning of prohibited conduct, and must contain adequate protections
against arbitrary enforcement. Although the doctrine guards the interests
of criminal defendants, it is difficult for defendants to prevail on a void-
for-vagueness theory. In determining whether a statute withstands a
vagueness attack, courts apply well-established principles of statutory
construction that favor upholding the statute.
A. Statutes Must Provide Fair Notice and Protect Against Ad Hoc
Enforcement
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to require fundamental
fairness in the deprivation of liberty.' The void-for-vagueness doctrine is
an elaboration of these clauses that the Court has formulated in numerous
ways.6 A much-quoted passage from a 1926 case holds that a statute is
unconstitutional if it is written in such vague terms "that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application."7 There are two prongs to vagueness analysis, both of which
must be satisfied for a statute to pass constitutional muster. The first
deals with warning potential offenders, while the second applies to
guiding those enforcing the law.'
5. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,363-64 (1970).
6. Wayne R. LaFave, CriminalLaw § 2.3, at 90-91 (2d ed. 1986).
7. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
8. Id.
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Although individuals have a right to understand what behavior is
punishable by a particular law,9 the requirement of fair notice does not
mean that a person must be able to know the exact point at which
conduct crosses the line between permissible and punishable.0 All
language is vague to some extent, tt and laws do not have to meet
unrealistic standards of specificity in order to be constitutional. 2 For
obvious reasons, however, courts require a greater degree of certainty for
statutes that impose criminal sanctions than for those that impose civil
penalties. 1
3
The Supreme Court has indicated that the more important component
of vagueness analysis is the requirement of protections against arbitrary
enforcement. 4 This recognition comes in part because defendants will
usually not receive actual notice of statutory provisions." By contrast,
those charged with enforcing the statute need guidance from clear
standards, as these provide a check against law enforcement based on
personal biases. 6
The danger that a vague law will lead to arbitrary enforcement arises
in several contexts. Police officers and prosecutors may assume an
undue degree of discretion if a law does not provide them specific
criteria on which to base arrests and charges. 7 Furthermore, if judges
are unable to instruct juries as to what conduct the law prohibits, juries
must render verdicts without reference to a clear set of standards."8 This
lack of standards is just as problematic for judges conducting nonjury
trials. Additionally, appellate courts cannot determine whether or not
9. An individual's need to receive fair notice of prohibited conduct does not end with arrest. An
indictment must set forth a factual basis for the charges so that a defendant can prepare his or her
defense. United States v. Lane, 765 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1985).
10. See Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
11. See City of Seattle v. Eze, 111 Wash. 2d 22,27,759 P.2d 366,368 (1988).
12. See United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
13. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982).
14. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983).
15. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974). One exception to this general observation
applies to individuals operating businesses, who will likely actually consult statutes to ensure that
their operations are in conformity with the law. Id.
16. Id. at 575.
17. LaFave, supra note 6, § 2.3(c), at 95. See also John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness
and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 Va. L. Rev. 189, 196-97 (1985).
18. LaFave, supra note 6, § 23(c), at 95.
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trial courts have erred unless they can understand the legal standards by
which a defendant was convicted.19
However, just as with the fair notice test, the requirement of
safeguards against arbitrary enforcement does not mandate an unrealistic
degree of precision.2" Undue specificity could mean that offenders
whom legislators clearly meant to reach might not be charged simply
because they failed to match up precisely to the statute's charging
criteria.2' Thus, in applying both prongs of vaguen.ess analysis, courts
balance the ideal of fundamental fairness against ,society's interest in
effective law enforcement.
B. The Difficulties of Successfully Bringing a Void.for-Vagueness
Challenge
A defendant who brings a void for vagueness challenge can attack a
statute in two ways. She can argue that the statute is facially void, which
means that there are no instances in which the statute could permissibly
be applied.' She can also argue that the statute is void as applied to the
facts of her case. A court should consider a facial vagueness challenge
only if the statute in question threatens to inhibit the exercise of First
Amendment rights.23 Otherwise, it will proceed to an analysis of whether
the law is void as applied in the case before it.
24
A defendant who mounts a void-for-vagueness challenge has a
difficult argument to make. The defendant must prove impermissible
vagueness beyond a reasonable doubt.' This biu-den is made more
onerous by the widespread policy of U.S. courts to try to give effect to
the intent of legislatures by upholding the constitutionality of statutes.26
19. Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 80 n.72
(1960).
20. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
21. IA Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 21.16, at 138 (5th ed. 1992). See
also William C. Powers, Jr., Formalism and Nonformalism in Choice of Law Methodology, 52
Wash. L. Rev. 28, 30-31 (1976) (discussing the idea that formal rules bar some relevant information
from consideration and may thus lead to results in individual cases that ixe at odds with the policies
that generated the rules).
22. Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,494-95 (1982).
23. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361 (1988).
24. Id.
25. State v. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 118, 857 P.2d 270, 276 (1993).
26. 1A Singer, supra note 21, § 21.16, at 139.
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C. Interpretation of Statutes
In addressing vagueness challenges, courts often apply the "plain
meaning rule" of statutory interpretation.' Under this principle, courts
presume that words within a statute mean what they do in everyday
usage. If a court can infer a plain meaning from the language of the
statute, there is no need to refer to extrinsic sources." The Supreme
Court has held this principle to be "an axiom of experience," not a rule of
law that prevents courts from looking beyond the statutory language.29
Terms in a statute are often defined elsewhere within the same legal
code. In such cases, a court is generally bound by the statutory
definition." The definition may itself be so uncertain, however, that a
court is not obligated to apply it.3 ' Courts also look to other sources to
clarify statutes, most notably legislative history32 and case law
interpreting the statutes.33
Once a state's highest court has construed a statute, that construction
is treated as if it had always been part of the statutory language.34 Thus,
a court that finds a law was unduly vague at the time a defendant was
charged and convicted may nonetheless uphold the conviction by
adopting a narrowing construction that cures the statute's vagueness.35
In keeping with the fair warning aspect of the vagueness doctrine,
however, a court should avoid a construction that is not clearly supported
by the language of the statute.36
27. LaFave, supra note 6, § 2.2(b), at 76.
28. Id.
29. Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928). See also United States v.
American Trucking Ass'ns., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940); State v. McDougal, 120 Wash. 2d 334,
350-51, 841 P.2d 1232, 1241 (1992) (noting that in cases in which the enforcement of a law as it
literally reads would lead to absurd results, courts may examine not only the statute itself, but also
other legislative documents to ascertain the purpose of the law).
30. IA Singer, supra note 21, §20.08, at 90.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., State v. Talley, 122 Wash. 2d 192, 201-02, 858 P.2d 217, 222-23 (1993)
(examining legislative history to hold that a Washington malicious harassment statute was not
intended to regulate speech, but only harmful conduct).
33. Jeffries, supra note 17, at 207-08.
34. In re Vandervlugt, 120 Wash. 2d 427,436,842 P.2d 950, 955 (1992).
35. LaFave, supra note 6, § 2.4, at 105 (citing, inter alia, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507
(1948)).
36. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 160 (1990).
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Washington courts apply the test established by federal courts for
addressing a void-for-vagueness challenge. 7  Consequently, they
examine whether a statute provides fair notice to potential offenders and
whether it provides adequate safeguards against arbitrary enforcement.
Furthermore, unless appellants follow a prescribed set of guidelines,"
Washington courts do not consider vagueness arguments regarding the
state constitution, but focus only on possible federal constitutional
violations. In Halstien, the Washington Supreme Court framed its
vagueness analysis in terms of the United States Constitution. This Note
likewise limits its analysis to the federal framework.
II. OVERVIEW OF HALSTIEN
State v. Halstien arose from a residential burglary committed by a
juvenile. The defendant was convicted of committiag a second-degree
burglary with a sexual motivation. He argued before the supreme court
that the sexual motivation statute was both vague and overbroad, and that
two of the trial court's evidentiary rulings were reversible errors. The
supreme court rejected all these arguments and affirmed the conviction.
A. The Facts of Halstien
On the morning of November 3, 1990, 15-year-old Steve Halstien
broke into the house of a woman, C.B., who had been a customer on his
newspaper route.39  Prior to the burglary, C.B. had become
uncomfortable with the amount of attention Halstien showed her, and
with questions he asked her that she deemed to be inappropriate. As she
37. State v. Talley, 122 Wash. 2d 192,212, 858 P.2d 217,228 (1993).
38. Defendants may argue that the Washington State Constitution affords them broader rights than
does the United States Constitution. Courts will not consider such arguments, however, unless
defendants brief six factors that the Washington Supreme Court enumerated in State v. Gunwall, 106
Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986). The Gunwall factors are as follows: (1) the text of the state
constitution; (2) ways in which the state constitution differs significantly from corresponding
provisions of the federal constitution; (3) the history behind the adoption of the passage in question,
including legislative intent as well as common-law influences; (4) preexisting state law; (5)
structural differences between the two constitutions (whereas the federal constitution enumerates the
powers which the government may exercise, the state constitution focuses on limiting the sovereign
immunity of the people and the representatives they elect); and (6) whether the right at issue is a
matter of state, rather than federal concern (i.e., whether the subject matter is local in character and
does not involve issues calling for national uniformity). Id. at 61-62, 720 P.2d at 812-13.
39. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1-2, State v. Halstien, No. 91-8-00574-7 (Super.
Ct. Juv. Div. Aug. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Findings and Conclusions], af'd, 65 Wash. App. 845, 829
P.2d 1145 (1992), aff'd, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993).
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testified at trial, Halstien often inquired about her clothes, car, stereo, and
house.4" She testified that he "gave [her] the creeps when he came to the
door and collected," and that this uneasiness prompted her to cancel her
subscription.41 Halstien continued delivering the papers anyway. During
the eight months before the break-in, C.B. often heard noises outside her
house after midnight, and then found the gate in the fence around her
house open the next morning. She began finding bum holes in her
window screens near the latches and noticed that some of her screens
were missing. At about 10 p.m. on the Friday preceding the burglary,
Halstien came to her house to collect on the newspaper subscription.42
When C.B. came to the door barefoot, with bloodshot eyes, and wearing
an oversized sweater, Halstien asked her if she had had to get dressed to
answer the door. 3 C.B. testified that she did not find it unusual at the
time that Halstien had come at such a late hour because she was often
away from home earlier in the evening:'
At the time of the burglary, C.B. was sleeping in her bedroom on the
ground floor of her house. At approximately 7:30 in the morning, she
heard a noise upstairs and went to see what had caused it. She found the
bathroom window broken. Searching her house, C.B. found no valuables
or money missing,45 although a box of condoms and a vibrator had been
taken. Police found muddy footprints in several rooms, including some
around her bed. The burglar had also sifted through a box of
photographs of C.B., scattering them over the floor of an upstairs room.
A police officer who had investigated the break-in testified at trial to
seeing a substance on one of the photographs that he believed was semen
or some other bodily fluid. When the picture was dusted for fingerprints,
the substance was contaminated, making positive identification of the
substance impossible.46
40. State v. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 112,857 P.2d 270,273 (1993).
41. Id., 857 P.2d at 273.
42. Id. at 113, 857 P.2d at 273.
43. Brief of Appellant at 5, State v. Halstien, 65 Wash. App. 845, 829 P.2d 1145 (1992) (No.
28870-9-I) [hereinafter Brief of Appellant], aft'd, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). C.B.'s
appearance when she answered the door was a detail which the supreme court's opinion omitted.
Halstien's question, which sounds inappropriate when considered out of context, seems less so under
the circumstances in which he asked it.
44. State v. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 112-13, 857 P.2d 270, 273 (1993).
45. Among the valuable items in the woman's home at the time of the burglary were a wallet
containing $200, four televisions, and stereo equipment. Id.
46. Id. at 113-14, 857 P.2d at 273-74.
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During questioning following the break-in, Halstien confessed. He
admitted to having made cigarette burns in the victin's window screens
at the time of the burglary.47 He said that he did not know why he had
stolen the vibrator and condoms. He told the interrogator he had
smashed the vibrator against a tree near C.B.'s house; the item was found
broken in pieces as he had indicated. Halstien also said that he took the
condoms with him after throwing the box away.4"
In a nonjury trial,49 Halstien was convicted of committing second-
degree burglary" with a sexual motivation.51 The sentencing court found
the standard-range sentence 2 of five to ten days for second-degree
burglary to be a manifest injustice53 and sentenced Halstien to 104 weeks
47. Id. at 114, 857 P.2d at 274.
48. Brief of Appellant, supra note 43, at 7-8.
49. Juveniles who are charged under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1977 do not have a constitutional
right to a jury trial. State v. Lawley, 91 Wash. 2d 654,655, 591 P.2d 772 (1979).
50. Second-degree burglary is defined as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree if, with intent to commit a crime against a
person or property therein, he enters or remains unlawfully in a building other than a vehicle or
a dwelling.
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.52.030 (1992). Halstien burglarized a residence, and thus was not properly
charged under this statute. Whether he may have successfully appealed his conviction on the basis
of this error lies beyond the scope of this Note.
51. Findings and Conclusions, supra note 39, at 5. The juvenile sexual motivation statute, Wash.
Rev. Code § 13.40.135 (1992), reads as follows:
(1) The prosecuting attorney shall file a special allegation of sexual motivation in every
juvenile offense other than sex offenses as defined in RCW 9.94A.030(29)(a) or (c) when
sufficient admissible evidence exists, which, when considered with the most plausible,
reasonably consistent defense that could be raised under the evidence, would justify a finding of
sexual motivation by a reasonable and objective fact-finder.
(2) In a juvenile case wherein there has been a special allegation the state shall prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the offense with a sexual motivation. The court
shall make a finding of fact of whether or not the sexual motivation was present at the time of
the commission of the offense. This finding shall not be applied to sex offenses as defined in
RCW 9.94A.030(29)(a) or (c).
(3) The prosecuting attorney shall not withdraw the special allegation of "sexual motivation"
without approval of the court through an order of dismissal. The court shall not dismiss the
special allegation unless it finds that such an order is necessary to ccrrect an error in the initial
charging decision or unless there are evidentiary problems which make proving the special
allegation doubtful.
52. Wash. Rev. Code § 13A0.0357 (1992) sets out the system for determining the standard
sentences to be imposed on juvenile offenders. The sentences are based in part on "offense points"
which depend on such factors as the category of the offense and th.- age of the offender. The
severity of the sentences also depends on whether the juvenile is a first, middle, or serious offender.
53. Wash. Rev. Code § 13A0.020(16) (1992) defines "manifest injustice" as "a disposition that
would either impose an excessive penalty on the juvenile or would impose a serious, and clear
danger to society in light of the purposes of this chapter." Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.160(4)(c)
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at the Department of Juvenile Rehabilitation.54 The court of appeals
upheld the conviction,55 and the supreme court granted review. 6
B. Halstien Challenges His Convictions
Halstien appealed his conviction to the supreme court under three
theories. First, he argued that the sexual motivation statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad." Second, he asserted that the statute was
void for vagueness, both facially and as applied to the facts of his case. 8
Finally, he argued that the admissions into evidence of testimony about
his prior contacts with C.B. and the police officer's testimony regarding
the substance on the photograph were reversible errors. 9
1. Vagueness Arguments Were Unsuccessful
The supreme court held that the sexual motivation statute was not void
for vagueness, either facially or as applied to the facts of Halstien's
(1992) provides that in sentencing middle offenders (such as HaIstien), when a court finds that a
manifest injustice would result under the standard sentencing scheme, the court may impose an
alternative disposition. A judge has broad discretion in such a case, as evidenced by the criteria the
alternative disposition must meet in order to be upheld on appeal:
[Tihe court of appeals must find (a) that the reasons supplied by the disposition judge are
supported by the record which was before the judge and that those reasons clearly and
convincingly support the conclusion that a disposition within the range, or nonconfinement for a
minor or first offender, would constitute a manifest injustice, and (b) that the sentence imposed
was neither clearly excessive nor clearly too lenient.
Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.230(2) (1992). Halstien unsuccessfully challenged the manifest injustice
finding before the court of appeals. State v. Halstien, 65 Wash. App. 845, 853-56, 829 P.2d 1145,
1150-51 (1992), af'd, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). He did not raise the issue again
before the supreme court.
54. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Upon a Manifest Injustice Disposition at 5, State v.
Halstien, No. 91-8-00574-7 (Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1991), aff'd, 65 Wash. App. 845, 829 P.2d 1145
(1992), aft'd, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993). This aggravated sentence was based on a
number of factors, including the fact that after the first burglary Halstien was arrested for a second
burglary, during which he was allegedly carrying knives; the fact that a sex-offender therapist found
him to be at high risk to reoffend; and the finding by the trial court that before and during the
burglary of C.B.'s house, Halstien had shown predatory and obsessive behavior toward her. Id. at 3.
55. State v. Halstien, 65 Wash. App. 845, 847, 829 P.2d 1145, 1147 (1992), aft'd, 122 Wash. 2d
109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993).
56. State v. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 115, 857 P.2d 270,274 (1993).
57. Petition for Review at 15-17, State v. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d 109, 857 P.2d 270 (1993) (No.
28870-9-I) [hereinafter Petition for Review].
58. Id. at 9-15.
59. Id. at 18-19.
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case.' Since a statute must threaten First Amendment freedoms before a
court properly considers a facial vagueness challenge,6' the court's
rejection of Halstien's overbreadth argument62 meant that a facial
vagueness challenge would also fail. Therefore, only an as-applied
vagueness theory merited serious consideration.
The court offered several justifications for holding that the statute was
not void for vagueness. First, the court found that the term "sexual
motivation" is clear enough to inform ordinary persons of the proscribed
conduct.63 Second, the statute requires that the finding of sexual
motivation be based upon the defendant's conduct in committing the
underlying offense.64 Third, the court found that the statute contains
sufficient safeguards against arbitrary enforcement. 5
2. Halstien Challenged the Trial Court's Evidentiary Rulings
The supreme court found that the evidence of prior contacts between
Halstien and the victim was relevant to the issue of lis motive or intent.'
However, the court agreed with Halstien's assertion that the trial judge
should have stated on the record that the probative value of Halstien's
prior contacts with the victim outweighed the danger of undue prejudice
to his case.67 Nonetheless, the court deemed this oversight on the part of
the trial judge to be harmless error because the burglary itself provided
sufficient evidence to prove Halstien's sexual motivation. Thus, the
challenged evidence did not materially affect the outzome of the trial.68
60. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 121,857 P.2d at 278.
61. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356,361 (1988).
62. Halstien argued that the sexual motivation statute was unconstitutionally overbroad in that it
had the effect of "chilling" speech protected by the First Amendment. The court found overly
speculative the possibility that individuals would suppress thoughts of a sexual nature so that such
thoughts could not later be used against them in a criminal prosecution. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at
124-25, 857 P.2d at 279-80.
63. Id. at 118, 857 P.2d at 276.
64. Id. at 120, 857 P.2d at 277.
65. Id. at 121,857 P.2d at 277-78.
66. Id. at 126, 857 P.2d at 280.
67. Id., 857 P.2d at 280. Evidence Rule 404(b) allows the admissior of evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts by an individual for the purpose of proving motive. Wash. R. Evid. 404. Such
admissions depend upon a court's determination, under Evidence Rule 403, that the probative value
of the evidence outweighs the danger of unfairly prejudicing the defendant. Wash. R. Evid. 403.
68. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 127, 857 P.2d at 281. This conclusion is questionable because the
supreme court's own determination that the burglary itself provided sufficient evidence of sexual
motivation does not necessarily mean the trial court would have made -le sexual motivation finding
without considering the prior contacts. In fact, the trial court's justificr.tion for the finding of sexual
826
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Halstien likewise challenged the admission of testimony about the
substance on the photograph, contending that the danger of unfair
prejudice outweighed the evidence's probative worth. The court noted
that the trial court had apparently attached no weight to this evidence, as
it made no mention of the testimony in its findings and conclusions.69
Thus, even if the trial court should have excluded the testimony because
of the danger of unfair prejudice, any evidentiary error was harmless.70
The court's holdings on the evidentiary issues meant that the trial
court could legitimately have found sexual motivation in Halstien's
conduct by examining only the facts of the burglary. Furthermore, the
most potentially damaging piece of evidence from the burglary was not
essential to this finding. These holdings on the evidentiary issues
become important as one considers the dictates of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine and inquires whether the court validly rejected Halstien's
vagueness challenge.
III. FLAWS IN THE HALSTIEN DECISION
In finding that the sexual motivation statute does not infringe First
Amendment rights,7 the court was able to dispense effectively with
Halstien's facial vagueness challenge, as well as with his charge of
overbreadth. The court was far less convincing, however, in defending
its conclusion that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied
to the facts of Halstien's case. The opinion leaves serious questions as to
whether Halstien had fair notice that his actions would lead to a charge
of sexual motivation. Halstien likewise fails to alleviate doubts about
whether the statute protects against ad hoc enforcement.
A. The Fair Notice Requirement
A key point in Halstien's void-for-vagueness argument was that the
idea of a sexual motivation for a nonsexual offense is too vague to give
motivation includes several implicit references to these contacts ("The respondent had a desire to be
in the victim's presence." "The respondent was attracted to and fascinated with the victim, and his
obsession went far beyond adolescent curiosity." "The respondent's history of behavior with the
victim further supports the conclusion that he was obsessive.'). Findings and Conclusions, supra
note 39, at 4.
69. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 128, 857 P.2d at 281.
70. Id., 857 P.2d at 281.
71. See supra note 62.
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fair warning of what conduct the statute proscribes. 72 The supreme court
responded that the term that Halstien found unacceptably vague is
defined in Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020(25), which states: "'Sexual
motivation' means that one of the purposes for which the respondent
committed the offense was for the purpose of his or her sexual
gratification."'73 This attempt to explain sexual motivation only raises the
question of when a person can be said to be acting for the purpose of
sexual gratification.
In an effort to show that "sexual gratification" is a readily
understandable concept, the court cited74 a previous Washington case, In
re Adams,75 in which a defendant was found to have acted in order to
gratify sexual desire. In Adams, a case involving an indecent liberties
statute, the Washington Court of Appeals found that when a defendant
had placed his hands on a female minor's hips when her slacks were
down to her mid-thigh, and had then stretched himself out prone on top
of her, it was clear that the defendant had acted for the purpose of sexual
gratification.76 However, the supreme court failed to note crucial
distinctions between Adams and Halstien. Adams involved a statute that
could be violated only by an interaction between individuals.
Furthermore, the statute provided that this interaction had to involve
sexual contact.77  The language of the sexual motivation statute, by
contrast, requires neither that the offender be in anyone's presence at the
time of the violation, nor that he or she engage in overt sexual behavior.
Thus, the indecent liberties statute explicitly described the conduct that
would result in criminal charges, whereas the sexual motivation statute
leaves culpable conduct undefined.
72. Petitionfor Review, supra note 57, at 11-12.
73. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020(25) (Supp. 1993).
74. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 119, 857 P.2d at 276-77.
75. 24 Wash. App. 517, 601 P.2d 995 (1979).
76. Id. at 518, 601 P.2d at 996.
77. The provision at issue in Adams read as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of indecent liberties when he knowingly causes another person who is not
his spouse to have sexual contact with him or another
(a) By forcible compulsion; or...
(2) For purposes of this section, "sexual contact" means any touching of the sexual or other
intimate parts of a person done for the purpose of gratifying sexual desire of either party.
Wash. Rev. Code § 9A.88.100 (recodified 1979 as § 9A.44.100, amended 1988) (as quoted in
Adams, 24 Wash. App. at 519, 601 P.2d at 996).
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Adams also involved an unsuccessful vagueness challenge to the
statutory phrase "sexual or other intimate parts." '78 The court of appeals
held that a person of common intelligence would have known the
minor's hips were "sexual or other intimate parts," especially if the
person were touching them in a way that suggested an attempt at sexual
gratification.79 In addition to Adams, the Halstien court pointed to three
other cases-State v. Johnson,0 State v. Galbreath,8 and State v.
Bohannon82 as examples of unsuccessful vagueness challenges to
statutes "containing language similar to the juvenile sexual motivation
statute." 3  These cases are readily distinguishable from Halstien,
however, in that the challenged statutes defined the proscribed conduct
and thus clarified phrases that otherwise might have been unduly vague.84
In Johnson, a defendant who was convicted of statutory rape and
indecent liberties challenged the same language at issue in Adams-the
phrase "intimate parts."8 5 Relying on Adams to dismiss the vagueness
challenge,86 the Johnson court held in a separate portion of the opinion
that when the defendant had wiped a five-year-old girl's genitals with a
washcloth, and then induced her to perform fellatio on him, it was clear
that the defendant had taken indecent liberties when he touched the girl's
78. Adams, 24 Wash. App. at 518-21,601 P.2d at 997-98.
79. Id. at 520-21,601 P.2d at 997-98.
80. 96 Wash. 2d 926, 639 P.2d 1332 (1982).
81. 69 Wash. 2d 664,419 P.2d 800 (1966).
82. 62 Wash. App. 462, 814 P.2d 694 (1991).
83. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 119-120, 857 P.2d at 277.
84. See supra note 77 for relevant portions of the indecent liberties statute at issue in Adams; the
defendant in Johnson addressed his vagueness challenge to the same statute. Johnson, 96 Wash. 2d
at 929-30, 639 P.2d at 1333-34.
The provision at issue in Galbreath read as follows:
(2) Every person who takes any indecent liberties with or on the person of any child under the
age of fifteen years, or makes any indecent or obscene exposure of his person, or of the person
of another, whether with or without his or her consent, shall be guilty of a felony.
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.79.080(2) (repealed 1975) (as quoted in Galbreath, 69 Wash. 2d at 665-66,
419 P.2d at 802).
The provision at issue in Bohannon read as follows at the time of the offense:
(1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor if the person...
(b) Aids, or causes a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct, knowing that such conduct
will be photographed or part of a live performance; ....
Wash. Rev. Code § 9.68A.040 (amended 1989) (as quoted in Bohannon, 62 Wash. App. at 464 n.1,
814 P.2d at 695 n.1).
85. 96 Wash. 2d at 929-30,639 P.2d at 1334.
86. Id., 639 P.2d at 1333.
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private parts.8 7 In Galbreath, a defendant convicted of indecent exposure
argued that the words "indecent" and "obscene" were impermissibly
vague as used in the challenged statute."8 The supreme court held that
these words, when used in the phrase "indecent or obscene exposure of
the person," were not unconstitutionally vague because that phrase
suggested an obvious meaning to persons of common intelligence. 9 The
defendant in Bohannon, who was convicted of sex'aal exploitation after
taking nude photographs of a female minor, challenged the term
"sexually explicit conduct" as unduly vague.' The supreme court,
noting that the statutory definition of this term included exposure of
private parts for the purpose of sexually stimulating the viewer, held that
a person of common intelligence would have known that the statute
proscribed the defendant's conduct.9'
Adams, Johnson, Galbreath, and Bohannon effectively illustrate the
difficulty of prevailing on a vagueness challenge to a sex offense statute
in Washington. They do not clarify, however, the kind of conduct that
an offender would have to display in order tc violate the sexual
motivation statute at issue in Halstien. Furthermore, the court's
observation that the challenged statutes in these cases had similar
language to that of the sexual motivation statute is misleading. Although
Adams, Johnson, and Bohannon involved statutes that mentioned sexual
gratification or sexual stimulation, these statutes also described
prohibited acts.92  The sexual motivation statute offers no such
clarification of proscribed behavior. Without describing the conduct
from which courts will infer sexual motivation, the statute does not
provide fair notice to potential offenders, and thus fails the first test of
vagueness analysis.
The lack of fair warning is underscored by the statute's provisions for
filing the sexual motivation charge. The statute provides that when
sufficient admissible evidence exists to justify the finding of sexual
motivation and to overcome the most plausible defense, "[the
prosecuting attorney shall file a special allegation of sexual motivation in
every juvenile offense other than sex offenses . . . ."" A juvenile who
87. Id. at 934, 639 P.2d at 1336.
88. 69 Wash. 2d at 666-67,419 P.2d at 802.
89. Id. at 668-69, 419 P.2d at 803.
90. Bohannon, 62 Wash. App. at 466-69, 814 P.2d at 696-97.
91. Id. at 468-69, 814 P.2d at 697.
92. See supra notes 77 and 84.
93. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.135(1) (1992).
830
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shoplifted a box of condoms would presumably be subject to an
enhanced punishment under the statute, since the theft could reasonably
be ascribed to a desire for sexual gratification. A juvenile who stole an
item of equal or greater value but without sexual applications, such as a
box of candy, would avoid the added penalty. Imposing a greater
punishment on the juvenile who shoplifts the condoms not only offends
basic notions of fairness, but also does little to advance the policy of
intercepting and treating potential sex offenders before they bring harm
to others.94 Not every juvenile offense other than a sex offense should
come within the purview of the sexual motivation statute. No limitations
now exist, however, to ensure that the statute reaches only those
offenders whose conduct suggests a propensity for sex offenses.
B. Protection Against Arbitrary Enforcement
Even if the Halstien court correctly concluded that potential offenders
have adequate notice of what conduct the sexual motivation statute
proscribes, the court should have recognized that the statute provides
inadequate protections against arbitrary or ad hoc enforcement. Neither
the statutory language nor judicial interpretations have explained what
conduct is chargeable under the statute. This indeterminacy can lead to
one person's being charged with sexual motivation, while an equally
culpable offender whose case involves slightly different facts may escape
this allegation. Also contributing to the danger of arbitrary enforcement
is the lack of a standard prescribing how large a portion of a defendant's
overall motivation the sexual component must be. Halstien failed to
alleviate these infirmities.
1. The Court's "Some Conduct" Standard Is Not a Useful Narrowing
Construction
In a further attempt to show that the sexual motivation statute was not
impermissibly vague, the court interpreted the statute to require that the
finding of sexual motivation "be based on some conduct forming part of
the body of the underlying felony."95 The opinion further asserted that
94. See Task Force on Community Protection, Final Report to Governor Booth Gardner at II-8
(1990) [hereinafter Task Force].
95. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 120, 857 P.2d at 277 (emphasis in original) (quoting State v.
Halstien, 65 Wash. App. 845, 853, 829 P.2d 1145, 1150 (1992)). This interpretation derives from a
provision of the statute requiring a finding that "the sexual motivation was present at the time of the
commission of the offense.' Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.135(2) (1992).
Washington Law Review
the statute punishes only identifiable conduct durin:g the commission of
the offense that shows the defendant was acting for the purpose of sexual
gratification.96 This is a circular explanation that leaves unanswered the
question of what kind of conduct would support a finding of sexual
motivation. Without a clearer guide as to actions by an offender that
would indicate sexual motivation, those who enforc:e the statute run the
risk of arbitrary enforcement.
The court rejected Halstien's argument that a finding of sexual
motivation should be based only on sexual contact, reasoning that if
there is sexual contact, the defendant can then be charged under sex
offense statutes.97 The court explained that the purpose of the sexual
motivation statute was to supplement sex offense statutes and to treat
offenders before they actually commit sex offenses.9" Since individuals
can derive sexual gratification in ways other than by sexual contact,99 the
court was correct in not adopting a sexual contact requirement for the
sexual motivation statute. The court was remiss, however, in not
proceeding to offer a meaningful conduct requirement in place of sexual
contact. A statute's laudable purpose does not obviate the due process
requirement of setting forth ascertainable standards of guilt."°°
The court emphasized that the statute contains several procedural
safeguards against arbitrary enforcement."l ' Specifically, a prosecutor
may file the sexual motivation charge only when sufficient admissible
evidence exists to support the allegation against a defendant's most
plausible defense. Additionally, the prosecution must prove the charge
beyond a reasonable doubt. Finally, the trial court must enter a finding
of fact as to whether the offense was committed with a sexual
motivation. °2 As reassuring as these safeguards may sound, they are not
meaningful unless there is a clear definition of culpable conduct under
the statute. Without this definition, prosecutors cannot know what
evidence is sufficient to support the allegation, and judges cannot
determine whether the prosecution has proved its case.
One can see that this indeterminacy worked to Halstien's disadvantage
by comparing the circumstances of his offense with a slightly altered
96. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 120, 857 P.2d at 277.
97. Id. at 120-21,857 P.2d at 277.
98. Id. at 121,857 P.2d at 277.
99. See, e.g., Irwin G. Sarason & Barbara 1 Sarason, Abnormal Psychology 225 (5th ed. 1987).
100. Kolenderv. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,361 (1983).
101. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 121, 857 P.2d at 277-78.
102. See supra note 51 for text of Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.135 (1992).
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scenario. If one accepts the supreme court's statements that neither the
police officer's testimony concerning the substance on the photograph
nor the evidence concerning Halstien's prior contacts with C.B. was
necessary for the finding of sexual motivation, 3 the remaining evidence
that supports this finding is remarkably sparse. Of chief significance is
Halstien's theft of the vibrator and condoms while leaving valuables
untouched, as well as the interest he showed in C.B.'s photographs."°
One can imagine another burglar, just as fascinated with the victim as
Halstien was, who might behave just as he did, except that this burglar
steals more than just the vibrator and condoms. If the burglar also takes
a wallet, stereo equipment, and jewelry, a sexual motivation will be far
less apparent than in Halstien's case. The clouding of this burglar's
motivations could mean he would escape charges under the sexual
motivation statute, with the result that he would receive a lighter
sentence for a more serious offense. This incongruous result
demonstrates one way in which the sexual motivation statute invites
arbitrary enforcement.
2. Halstien Fails To Articulate a Standard for Causation
Another weakness in the arbitrary enforcement context is the statute's
failure to specify how large a proportion of the overall motivation the
sexual component must be. While the Halstien decision noted the
finding by the trial court that the sexual motivation was a "primary
motivation" behind the burglary," 5 the supreme court did not indicate
whether a "primary motivation" finding is necessary under the statute.
The court confused matters when it concluded that sufficient evidence
existed for the trial court to find that "one of Halstien's motives" was
sexual gratification. 6
A requirement that the prosecution show that "one of the purposes"
for the defendant's actions was sexual gratification is less rigorous than a
103. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 126-28, 857 P.2d at 280-81.
104. These were the only specific acts which the trial judge cited to support the finding of sexual
motivation, although the judge also noted Halstien's obsession with the victim, as well as his
"lurking behavior" during the burglary. Findings and Conclusions, supra note 39, at 3-4. Whether
any of Halstien's other actions (e.g., making cigarette bums in window screens, smashing the
vibrator against a tree) suggested a sexual motivation is a matter which only experts in human
psychology should address. At any rate, these other actions do not appear to have figured in the trial
court's determination of sexual motivation.
105. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 114, 857 P.2d at 274.
106. Id. at 129, 857 P.2d at 282.
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"primary motivation" standard."°7 Without knowing what standard to
apply, a trial judge cannot determine whether the stal:e has met its burden
of proof. This lack of guidance invites arbitrary enforcement.
If sexual motivation needs to be present only to some degree, the
state's case is easily made. During adolescence, males experience
increases of up to 1800 percent in their levels of testosterone, 08 the
strongest biological factor in their sex drive.'09 With sex hormones
present at such high levels in teenagers, one would expect the desire for
sexual gratification to be influencing their conduct at virtually all times.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE STATUTE'S AMBIGUITIES
The error of the Halstien court lay not in upholding the
constitutionality of the sexual motivation statute, but in treating the
statute as if it were already sufficiently clear. Had the court offered
meaningful clarifications, it could have more persuasively rejected
Halstien's void-as-applied arguments, since such clarifications would
operate as though they had always been part of the statute."0 The court
therefore missed an opportunity to adopt narrowing constructions that
would satisfy constitutional dictates of fair warring and safeguards
against arbitrary enforcement.
A. The Finding of Sexual Motivation Should Require a Deviant Sexual
Disorder
The Halstien court contended that one of the protections against
arbitrary enforcement of the sexual motivation statute is the requirement
that the finding be based on some conduct forming part of the body of
the underlying offense."' This judicial gloss is hardly of assistance to
prosecutors and judges, for it leaves them to decide for themselves what
kind of conduct should trigger the statute.
The task force report that proposed the sexual motivation statute
emphasized the need for sentencing options that would allow sexually
107. United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D. Mass. 1986), ajfd, 813 F.2d 447 (1st Cir.
1987).
108. Robert H. Blum, Adolescent Medicine, 263 JAMA 2621, 2621 (1990).
109. Boyce Rensberger, Sex Drive: Major Questions Persist; Desp te Studies, Clear Definition
Still Defies The Experts, L.A. Times, Nov. 26, 1987, Part 5A, at 18.
110. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
111. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 120, 857 P.2d at 277.
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motivated offenders to receive treatment."2 Presumably, such treatment
should address some kind of disorder in the offenders; if a sexually
motivated offense is just an isolated event, and not representative of the
offender's psychological functioning, that person may not be an
appropriate candidate for treatment." 3 In its effort to give effect to a
policy of intercepting prospective sex offenders, the Halstien court
would have been wise to consult psychological literature to learn what
experts consider to be deviant sexual behavior. The court could then
have placed a sensible narrowing construction on the sexual motivation
statute by requiring that a defendant display signs of a sexual disorder
while committing the underlying offense. This construction would be an
improvement over the court's "some conduct" standard'1 4 for two
reasons. First, a "sexual disorder" standard is more narrowly tailored to
the goal of identifying and treating prospective sex offenders. Second,
this standard offers more guidance to prosecutors and judges and thus
guards against arbitrary enforcement.
Psychologists recognize three categories of paraphilia, or "attraction
to the deviant."... 5 The first type involves a tendency to engage in sexual
encounters that involve the infliction of pain or suffering. The second
involves a disposition toward achieving sexual arousal using nonhuman
objects. The third type involves a tendency to achieve sexual arousal
from nonconsenting partners." 6
Since the sexual motivation statute applies in cases in which the
offender is not acting directly upon a victim, the first class of
paraphilia-requiring an actual encounter between individuals-would
not be relevant in cases involving the statute. On the other hand, an
individual who committed an offense other than a sex offense and fell
into either of the other categories would be an appropriate candidate for
the sexual motivation charge.
For example, a burglar who declined to steal valuable possessions, but
instead showed a preoccupation with women's underwear, sexual
paraphernalia, or other objects with an intimate connection to the victim
might fit the second category of paraphilia. In Halstien's case, the trial
court would properly have examined whether his interest in the
112. Task Force, supra note 94, at 1-4.
113. See, e.g., Samson & Samson, supra note 99, at 84 ("Classifying abnormal behavior should be
a matter of drawing a picture of a person rather than simply marking a point on a graph.")
114. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
115. Samson & Sarason, supra note 99, at 225.
116. Id.
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photographs, the vibrator, and the condoms was a manifestation of this
second type of disorder. By contrast, a court hearing the case of a
burglar who steals an issue of Hustler as an afterthought would make a
similar inquiry, but would likely not find in this one act an abnormal
preoccupation with nonhuman objects.
A person who broke into a home hoping to achieve sexual arousal by
spying on its occupant might fit the third category of paraphilia,
involving a need to achieve sexual arousal from nonconsenting
partners. 17 Halstien's behavior prior to the burglary, particularly his
tendency to spend more time outside C.B.'s house than was necessary to
discharge his duties as a newspaper deliverer, would have been relevant
to this inquiry.1 ' The fact that during the burglary Halstien apparently
walked around the sleeping woman's bed without touching her would
also be a point to consider.
Judges and juries without expertise in sexual disorders would
normally be ill-equipped to decide whether a defendant's conduct during
the course of an offense indicated a sexual disorder. Testimony by
expert witnesses would be necessary. A Washington statute"1 9 already
authorizes judges to order examinations of convicted juvenile sex
offenders to determine if they are amenable to treatment. 20  Because of
117. This third category of paraphilia includes voyeurism. David L. Rosenhan & Martin E.P.
Seligman, Abnormal Psychology 432 (2d ed. 1989).
118. The supreme court seems to support an examination of prior contacts to aid the inquiry into
sexual motivation. Although the court held that Halstien's prior contacts with the victim were not
necessary to the finding of sexual motivation, the supreme court also noted the relevance of these
contacts to the issue of sexual motivation. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the opinion quoted and concurred with the court of app rals' summary of evidence
demonstrating Halstien's sexual motivation, which noted that Halstien's prior contacts with the
victim indicated he held a strong interest in her. Halstien, 122 Wash. 2d at 129, 857 P.2d at 282
(quoting State v. Halstien, 65 Wash. App. 845, 851-52, 829 P.2d 1145, 1149 (1992)).
119. Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.160(5). This subsection vests sentencing judges with the
discretion to order post-conviction evaluations of first-time juvenile sex offenders to determine
whether the offenders are amenable to community-based treatment. Halstien's two-year sentence
was based, in part, on evaluations by a social worker who found Halstien at high risk to reoffend,
and thus a poor candidate for outpatient treatment. See supra, note 54.
120. In view of the enhanced sentences that juveniles may face because of the aggravating factor
of sexual motivation, the ordering of post-conviction evaluations of these offenders should not be
discretionary with the sentencing judge, but should be required before a judge imposes sentence. A
useful comparison can be made to a Minnesota statute that is aimed at patterned sex offenders, Minn.
Stat. § 609.1352 (1990). The statute authorizes judges to impose sentences that are over twice the
length of the presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines, but only if several criteria are
met. One is the requirement of a finding by a professional examiner that the offender is a patterned
sex offender who needs long-term treatment and supervision. Furthermore, the crime for which the
defendant is being sentenced must reasonably appear to the sentencing court to have been sexually
motivated. Finally, the offender must pose a threat to public safety. Id.
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the stigma that could accompany a person convicted of a sexually
motivated offense,' however, it is critical to determine at the trial stage
whether the offender's conduct rises to the level of a sexual disorder.
B. The Court Should 4dopt a "Substantial Factor" Test for
Evaluating Sexual Motivation
The Halstien court could have further clarified the sexual motivation
statute by delineating a required causal connection between sexual
motivation and the underlying crime. As Washington now defines
"sexual motivation," a juvenile whose criminal conduct is influenced to
any degree by a desire for sexual gratification is presumably chargeable
under the statute.'" The task force that drafted the sexual motivation
statute was concerned with intercepting future sex offenders in need of
treatment," rather than with penalizing individuals for the hormonal
onrush that accompanies adolescence. 4 If the court required sexual
motivation to clear a higher threshold than being merely "one of the
purposes" of a defendant's actions, the statute would still reach those in
This statute recently withstood several constitutional challenges in State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d
293 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1316 (1994). Christie, who had several prior convictions
for sex offenses, was sentenced under the patterned sex offender statute after burglarizing a couple's
home carrying only a condom, aware that the couple was home and that the complainant's wife was
in a place where she would be vulnerable to attack. Id. at 295-96. The Minnesota Supreme Court
held, inter alia, that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Christie's conduct, as
it was clear that his crime was "part of a predatory pattern of behavior that had criminal sexual
conduct as its goal." Id. at 301 (quoting Minn. Stat. § 609.1352, subd. 1(1) (1990)). Christie also
argued that the statute failed to satisfy due process dictates because it allowed sexual motivation to
be proven under a less strict standard than "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 297. The court
rejected this challenge as well, noting that a finding of sexual motivation, by itself, was not enough
to subject a person to sentence enhancement under the patterned sex offender statute. That finding
was only one of three factual determinations which were required to bring a person within the reach
of the statute. Id. at 298-99.
The three-part test of the Minnesota statute, in particular the requirement of specific findings by an
expert, offers a strong check against arbitrary enforcement. Washington's sexual motivation statute,
by not requiring expert testimony at either the trial or sentencing stage, does not deal as effectively
with this danger.
121. See Daniel Golden, Sex-Cons, Boston Globe, Apr. 4, 1993, Sunday Mag., at 12 (detailing the
post-incarceration lives of several sex offenders, including an 18-year-old Washington State resident
who, after serving time for raping two boys, was refused enrollment in a municipal school system,
was evicted from two apartments, and was able to find only one shelter in Olympia which was
willing to accept him).
122. See Wash. Rev. Code § 13.40.020(25) (Supp. 1993).
123. Task Force, supra note 94, at 1-4.
124. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
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need of treatment while protecting others from unwarranted
enhancements of their sentences.
Courts often hear cases in which they must consider the multiple
motives of a person's actions."' 5 They have adopted various tests for
determining the legal consequences of a proscribed motivation. At one
end of the spectrum is a test that attaches legal significance to a
motivation if it influenced an outcome to any degree. At the other end is
a test that requires that the motivation in question be the actor's sole
purpose. 6 Both these tests would place an unfair handicap on one of the
parties to a sexual motivation case. Under an "any degree" standard, a
juvenile charged under the statute would face the nearly impossible task
of proving a negative, namely, that there was no sexual motivation
present during the offense. 2 7 A "sole purpose" standard, on the other
hand, would require the prosecution to prove the absence of anything but
a sexual motivation, a heavy burden that could undermine legislative
intent. A "sole purpose" inquiry is also objectionable because of the
shaky premise that an individual's actions will have had only one
motivation. 12
Compromises between these extreme standards can be found in tort
law. A classic causation test in tort law is the "but for" inquiry.'9 If the
plaintiffs damages would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's
acts, the defendant's conduct is deemed to have been a cause of the
damages.130 This test may not always be appropriate, however. One area
in which the test has proved problematic is employment
discrimination."3 In a recent Washington case,'32 a plaintiff alleged her
dismissal from work was a retaliation against her for filing an age
125. United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 902 (D. Mass. 1986).
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
128. Washington's code implicitly recognizes this point by framing its definition of sexual
motivation in terms of "one of the purposes" of a defendant's actions. Wash. Rev. Code §
13A0.020(25) (Supp. 1993).
129. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41, at 266 (5th ed. 1984).
130. Id. Even if the defendant's conduct is a "but for" cause of the damages, however, the
defendant may not be held legally responsible for them. The nature aid degree of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the damages are important considerations in determining
liability. Id.
131. Employment discrimination suits are based on statutes, and thus not properly classified as
torts cases. However, the historical basis for these statutory causes of action lies in common-law tort
and contract claims. Mack A. Player, Employment Discrimination Law ,vii (1988).
132. Allison v. Housing Auth. of Seattle, 118 Wash. 2d 79, 821 P.2d 34 (1991).
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discrimination claim.'33 In this case, the Washington Supreme Court
deemed the "but for" standard too harsh, as it required the plaintiff to
show the exact causal effects of her employer's legitimate and
illegitimate motivations.'34 Nonetheless, the court held that the plaintiff
could not prevail merely by showing that illegitimate motivations
influenced her dismissal to any degree.'35 As the court observed, this
standard would almost relieve the plaintiff of having to prove the
motivation and causation elements of her claim.'36 Adopting an
intermediate standard, the court held that the plaintiff had to prove that
retaliation was a substantial factor motivating her dismissal.137
A "substantial factor" test would work equally well in prosecutions
under the sexual motivation statute. Proof of sexual motivation as a
substantial factor influencing a defendant's conduct is a realistic
proposition for prosecutors. This standard also takes into consideration
the interests of defendants by helping to screen out individuals who have
not shown a propensity to become sex offenders. A juvenile who breaks
into a home in order to steal valuable items, but also carries off a copy of
Hustler he finds lying on the coffee table, has not behaved in a sexually
deviant way that calls for treatment. Such an individual would fall
outside the reach of the statute under a "substantial factor" test.
Another advantage of a "substantial factor" test is that judges are
already accustomed to applying it. In addition to using this test in civil
cases, "'38 Washington courts also apply it in criminal contexts.'39 The fact
that judges are familiar with "substantial factor" determinations provides
an additional safeguard against arbitrary enforcement of the statute.
The two narrowing constructions proposed here will help the sexual
motivation statute satisfy due process requirements. The sexual disorder
requirement is useful both in providing fair notice to potential offenders
and in clarifying punishable behavior for law enforcement officials and
judges. The requirement that the state prove sexual motivation as a
substantial factor is an added safeguard against arbitrary enforcement, for
133. Id. at 81, 821 P.2d at 35.
134. Id. at 87-88, 821 P.2d at 38.
135. Id. at 94-95, 821 P.2d at 42.
136. Id. at 94, 821 P.2d at42.
137. Id. at 95-96, 821 P.2d at 42-43.
138. See, e.g., supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 71 Wash. App. 556, 565, 861 P.2d 473, 479 (1993) (holding that in
criminal prosecutions, vulnerability of victim is a statutory aggravating factor if defendant knew of
vulnerability and the vulnerability was a substantial factor in accomplishing the crime).
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it helps judges to assess whether the prosecution has met its burden of
proof.
V. CONCLUSION
As it stands, the juvenile sexual motivation statute fails either to give
proper notice to potential offenders of what conduct is being proscribed,
or to provide standards that guard against unequal treatment of offenders.
At a minimum, the supreme court should have clarified the type of
conduct that will trigger the statute, as well as the extent to which the
sexual motivation must be a cause of the underlying crime. At the next
opportunity, Washington courts should construe the statute to require a
finding that the defendant manifests a sexual disorder, and to require that
the state prove sexual motivation was a substantial factor in the
defendant's actions. With these judicial glosses, the statute can
legitimately withstand constitutional challenges.
